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I.  INTRODUCTION 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL)1 unquestionably obligates parties 
to a conflict to “respect and protect” wounded and sick members of the 
armed forces, as well as the military personnel, facilities, and transportation 
exclusively engaged in their collection and care (non-combatant members of 
the armed forces and their equipment and facilities).  However, what seems 
less certain is how this obligation translates into protection from the harmful 
effects of actual combat operations—and furthermore, what the legal source 
and extent of such protection is.  While it is axiomatic that the wounded and 
sick and those who care for them are protected from deliberate attack, it is 
equally axiomatic that significant harm may be inflicted on them as an 
incidental consequence of an attack on an otherwise lawful target.  Is the 
attacking commander required to conduct a proportionality assessment based 
on this risk?  If so, are these individuals and assets to be accorded the same 
weight as civilians and civilian objects?2  Must an attacking commander 
consider feasible precautions to mitigate the risk to these individuals and 
objects?  Probing these questions exposes a rift in IHL interpretations of 
great potential significance for the protection of the wounded and sick and 
their caretakers. 
A number of provisions of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Law of 
War Manual indicate that military medical personnel, facilities, equipment, 
and military wounded and sick are not included within the scope of the IHL 
proportionality rule.3  However, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross’s (ICRC) new 2016 Commentary to the First Geneva Convention 
(GWS) takes a contrary view, indicating that both proportionality and 
precautions obligations extend to these people and objects.4  This Article 
                                                                                                                   
 1 In practice, International Humanitarian Law is used synonymously with Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC). 
 2 It is both important to note and contrast that, where harm to civilians and/or civilian 
objects is an anticipated risk of an attack against a lawful military objective, the attacking 
force is unquestionably required to respect the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, 
including compliance with the proportionality obligation.  See Protocol Additional (I) to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 51 [hereinafter AP I]. 
 3 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL §§ 7.3.3.1, 7.8.2.1, 7.10.1.1 
(June 2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].  
 4 See generally Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (2d ed. 
2016), paras. 1353–1357 [hereinafter 2016 Commentary GWS].  In 2016, the ICRC released an 
updated Commentary to the First Geneva Convention (GWS).  This Commentary supplanted the 
original 1952 Commentary, which was the first of four similar Commentaries drafted from 1952 
to 1960, all of which were published for each of the four Geneva Conventions. 
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proposes that both of these interpretations are patently flawed.5  The DoD 
Manual’s approach is preemptively dismissive of the obligation to protect the 
wounded and sick members of the armed forces, as well as those involved in 
their treatment.6  On the other hand, the ICRC’s 2016 Commentary fails to 
contemplate the adverse effects of its asserted blanket extension of 
proportionality and precautionary obligations.7  Ultimately, it is the nearly 
century and a quarter year-old Martens Clause that sheds thoughtful direction 
on this topic.  
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE IHL PROPORTIONALITY OBLIGATION 
At its core, IHL compliance is built upon several foundational principles: 
military necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality.8  Additionally, 
there is increasing recognition that the obligation to implement feasible 
precautions to mitigate civilian risk should also be included in this principles 
category.9  Though no treaty provides a dispositive definition of these 
principles, they are universally recognized as the baseline framework for 
regulating all armed conflicts.10  These principles function to ensure the 
employment of an efficient use of force that both accomplishes military 
objectives and minimizes the suffering associated with all armed conflict. 
A.  The Concept of Lawful Military Objective 
While each of these cardinal principles is of irrevocable importance to the 
regulation of armed conflict, the principle central to the issue raised in this 
Article is IHL proportionality.  However, to properly understand the function 
                                                                                                                   
 5 However, it cannot be stressed enough that the debate between these two sources has no 
relevance to the question of whether the civilian medical personnel, facilities, or wounded and 
sick fall within the scope of the LOAC/IHL proportionality (and furthermore, precautions) 
obligations.  As civilians and civilian objects, there can be no doubt about the affirmative 
answer to this question. 
 6 See generally DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 7.3.3.1, 7.8.2.1, 7.10.1.1. 
 7 See generally 2016 Commentary GWS, supra note 4, paras. 1353–1357. 
 8 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2.1; MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT ¶ 2.1 (U.K. Ministry of Defence ed., Oxford, 2004) [hereinafter UK LOAC 
MANUAL].  The United States and the United Kingdom apply each of these principles to all 
military operation.  Both have devoted an entire chapter of their respective military manual to 
the explanation of these principles.  This is a common thread found in nearly all military 
manuals, with some variation as to the respective principles listed. 
 9 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, Volume I. Rules, Chapters 5–6, Cambridge University Press, 2009, https:// 
www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf. 
 10 See UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.1; see also Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, 
supra note 9, at xxii. 
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of proportionality, it is first necessary to begin with a discussion of 
proportionality’s relationship to the principle of distinction, and more 
specifically, to the IHL concept of lawful military objective.  The reason for 
this is because proportionality considerations arise only after the determination 
that an intended object of attack is a military objective: that a person, place, or 
thing qualifies as a lawful military target (or objective).11  It is only after such 
determination that proportionality demands assessment of potential incidental 
death, injury, or destruction to civilians and civilian objects.12 
Pursuant to the principle of distinction, lethal combat power may only be 
directed at lawful targets.13  Targets can generally be broken down into 
“persons” and “things,” the latter of which need not be explained for 
purposes of this Article.  With regard to persons, most of the international 
community recognizes two categories: “combatants,” and “civilians” 
(frequently referred to as “non-combatants,” a term that is technically 
inaccurate as it instead denotes non-combatant members of the armed forces: 
medical personnel and chaplains exclusively engaged in the collection and 
care of the wounded and sick).14  The rule regarding civilians is clear: 
civilians are not to be made the deliberate object of attack, unless and only 
for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.15  On the other hand, 
combatants—as defined through a complex interrelationship of treaty 
                                                                                                                   
 11 See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 5.12.1 (specifically, the Manual 
provides, “In conducting attacks, the proportionality rule only need be applied when civilians 
or civilian objects are at risk of harm from attacks on military objectives”). 
 12 See AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(a)(iii), (2)(b) (although the approach of the ICRC’s  
2016 Commentary to the GWS would extend this protection to any person or object not 
subject to lawful deliberate attack 2016 Commentary GWS, supra note 4, para. 1357). 
 13 Id. art. 48. 
 14 UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶¶ 4.1–4.1.1.  The United States further complicates 
this by loosely claiming there to be a category of “unprivileged belligerents,” that fail to enjoy 
the benefits of civilians or combatants because of their membership in an unlawful armed 
group.  See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4.3.1.  This interpretation is highly 
controversial, and most nations observe an alternative approach offered by the ICRC rooted in 
the theory of “continuous combatant function” relating to civilians directly participating in 
hostilities.  See NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW 77 (May 2009). 
 15 See AP I, supra note 2, arts. 50–51.  Article 51(2) specifically states: “[T]he civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.  Acts or 
threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited.” Id. art. 51(2).  But furthermore, Article 50(1) widens the effect of 
such a provision by stating that, “[i]n case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person 
shall be considered a civilian.” Id. art. 50(1).  Direct participation in hostilities is a more 
complex discussion, but is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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provisions culminating with Article 43 of Additional Protocol I, are 
targetable at all times because of their combatant status.16  
The legal authority to attack combatants terminates, however, when the 
combatant is rendered wounded or sick within the meaning of IHL.17  
Specifically, pursuant to Article 12 of the GWS, wounded and sick members 
of the armed forces are to be respected and protected in all circumstances, 
and therefore deemed unlawful targets.18  However, not every illness or 
injury results in vesting the combatant with this cloak of protection.  The 
2016 Commentary explains that the term wounded and sick is best 
understood through the following two conditions: 
[1] The decisive criterion for determining when a person is 
wounded or sick in the sense of Article 12 . . . is that of being 
in need of medical care.  It is this particular need, and the 
specific vulnerability that comes with it, that the legal regime 
protecting the wounded and sick aims to address. 
 
. . .  
 
[2] In addition to being in need of medical care, in order to 
qualify as wounded or sick in the sense of Article 12, a person 
must also refrain from any act of hostility.  Thus, contrary to 
the ordinary meanings of the terms ‘wounded’ and ‘sick’, 
persons who continue to engage in hostilities do not qualify as 
wounded or sick under humanitarian law, no matter how severe 
their medical condition may be.19  
Wounded and sick members of the armed forces do not lose their status as 
combatants.20  Instead, their condition is better understood as vesting them 
with a cloak of protection for the time that they are wounded and sick.  Once 
recovered, that protection terminates and they are again subject to deliberate 
attack.21  If captured, they are prisoners of war for the entire duration of 
                                                                                                                   
 16 AP I, supra note 2, art. 43; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4(A)(1), (2), (3), (6), 
U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 970 [hereinafter GWS]. 
 17 GWS, supra note 16, art. 12. 
 18 Id. 
 19 2016 Commentary GWS, supra note 4, paras. 1342–1345. 
 20 See id. paras. 1341–1351. 
 21 See id. paras. 1345–1351. 
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captivity, with special protections derived from being wounded and sick.22  
Most importantly, the protection afforded to wounded and sick combatants in 
no way transforms them into civilians, or transforms their status into that of a 
civilian, while they are wounded and sick.23  Instead, they exist as a special 
category of members of an armed force that, for the duration of their tenure 
as wounded or sick, are protected from being made the object of attack.24 
Distinct from both combatants and civilians are what IHL classifies as 
non-combatant members of the armed forces.  These are members of the 
armed forces—military personnel—who are exclusively engaged in the 
humanitarian function of search for, collection, and care of the wounded and 
sick.25  This category of non-combatants is defined by Article 24 of the 
GWS, which provides: 
Medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or the 
collection, transport or treatment of the wounded or sick, or in 
the prevention of disease, staff exclusively engaged in the 
administration of medical units and establishments, as well as 
chaplains attached to the armed forces, shall be respected and 
protected in all circumstances.26 
Like wounded and sick combatants, non-combatant members of the armed 
forces must be respected and protected at all times, so long as they do not 
commit an “act harmful to the enemy” that is inconsistent with their 
exclusive “humanitarian duties.”27  This same protection extends to their 
facilities and equipment.28 
B.  Explaining IHL Proportionality 
With this basic understanding of lawful targets in mind, the relevance and 
application of the proportionality obligation vis-à-vis the wounded and sick 
and non-combatant members of the armed forces can be more accurately 
                                                                                                                   
 22 Id. art. 14, paras. 4–6 (“When wounded or sick prisoners of war have recovered, the First 
Convention no longer applies to them, but they remain protected by the Third Convention 
until the moment specified in Article 5 of that Convention—their final release and 
repatriation.”).  See also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 2, § 7.3.3.3 (iterating that the 
“wounded, sick, and shipwrecked must be respected and protected”). 
 23 Cf. 2016 Commentary GWS, supra note 4, art. 14, paras. 4–6. 
 24 See id. 
 25 GWS, supra note 16, art. 24. 
 26 Id. 
 27 2016 Commentary GWS, supra note 4, paras. 1995–1996. 
 28 GWS, supra note 16, art. 33. 
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understood.  The DoD Law of War Manual describes the “proportionality 
rule” in the following manner: “[c]ombatants must refrain from attacks in 
which the expected loss of life or injury to civilians, and damage to civilian 
objects incidental to the attack, would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”29  The United 
Kingdom’s Law of Armed Conflict Manual from the Ministry of Defence 
offers a similar definition, stating, “[t]he principle of proportionality requires 
that the losses resulting from a military action should not be excessive in 
relation to the expected military advantage.”30  These general definitions of 
the proportionality obligation are in large measure superseded by the more 
specific enumeration of the rule in Article 57(2)(a)(iii) and (2)(b) of 
Additional Protocol I: 
a)  those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: 
   . . .  
iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which 
may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated; 
b)  an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if . . . the 
attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated;31 
Accordingly, the proportionality obligation functions to protect civilians and 
civilian property that are reasonably assessed as subject to the harmful 
effects of an attack on a proximate lawful military objective—what the law 
characterizes as “incidental” injury or “collateral” damage.32  This protection 
takes the form of a prohibition against launching an attack on such an 
objective when the anticipated harm to civilians and/or civilian property is 
assessed as excessive in comparison to the anticipated “concrete and direct” 
                                                                                                                   
 29 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 5.12. 
 30 UK LOAC MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.6. 
 31 AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(a)(iii), (2)(b) (emphasis added) (notice the specific 
qualification of “civilian” in the definition, as well as the term “excessive”).  Article 57 is 
widely accepted as reflective of customary international law. 
 32 Id. 
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military advantage to be gained from the attack.  As Article 51(5)(b) of AP I 
indicates, an attack that violates the proportionality principle is considered 
indiscriminate and therefore unlawful.33 
There is simply no question that this proportionality obligation is 
triggered whenever an attack is anticipated to jeopardize civilian wounded 
and sick or civilian medical personnel and/or facilities.34  It is the civilian 
status of such individuals and objects—and not the fact that such individuals 
and facilities are associated with humanitarian protections focused on 
ameliorating the suffering of the wounded and sick—that implicates the 
obligation.  What is less clear, however, is whether the obligation also 
extends to protect military medical personnel, wounded and sick combatants, 
and military medical facilities.  This uncertainty is central to the questions 
raised above: how, if at all, does the presence of wounded and sick 
combatants and military medical personnel and facilities impact the legality 
of attacking proximate lawful objects of attack?  Is an attacking commander 
required to conduct a proportionality assessment based the anticipated risk 
that these individuals and facilities will suffer the incidental and collateral 
consequences of the attack?  Is a commander obligated to forego an attack if 
she assesses that the risk is excessive compared to the concrete and direct 
anticipated military advantage?  If so, is the weight accorded to these 
military personnel and assets identical to the weight accorded to civilians and 
civilian property when implementing the proportionality balance?  
Furthermore, if the proportionality obligation extends to protect these 
individuals and objects, does this mean the precautions obligation is also 
implicated?  Must a commander consider the feasible precautions to mitigate 
the risk to these individuals and objects?  As is indicated below, the ICRC’s 
2016 Commentary to the GWS and the DoD Manual provide conflicting 
answers to these questions. 
III.  THE PROPORTIONALITY DEBATE 
A.  Approach of the ICRC’s 2016 Commentary to the GWS  
In March 2016, the International Committee of the Red Cross released an 
updated Commentary to the First Geneva Convention of 1949.35  Among the 
many additions to the new Commentary is a discussion of the principle of 
                                                                                                                   
 33 See id. art. 51(5)(b). 
 34 See id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii), (2)(b); see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 16, 18, 20, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 
973 [hereinafter GC]. 
 35 See generally 2016 Commentary GWS, supra note 4, Foreword. 
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proportionality as it pertains to the wounded and sick members of the armed 
forces (and, by implication, military medical personnel and facilities), 
located within the Commentary’s discussion of Article 12(1)’s “respect and 
protect” clause.  Specifically, the Commentary indicates that: 
A question that arises is whether the obligation to respect the 
wounded and sick entails that they must be taken into 
consideration for the purposes of the proportionality 
assessment.  This is controversial and of particular relevance in 
the context of Article 12, which refers exclusively to wounded 
and sick members of the armed forces and other persons 
mentioned in Article 13 [establishing the qualification criteria 
for non-combatant members of the armed forces].36 
As is noted extensively throughout the Commentary to Article 12, there is no 
existing treaty provision that indicates any member of the armed forces—
even those who are wounded and sick and protected by the GWS or non-
combatant members of the armed forces—fall within the scope of the 
proportionality obligation.  For example, the Commentary indicates that:  
Article 51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, which is part of a 
specific chapter on ‘Civilians and Civilian Protection’, 
mentions civilians but not the wounded and sick specifically.37 
The omission of the wounded and sick from this provision 
might have been for editorial reasons, given the subject matter 
of the chapter, rather than the intentional exclusion of certain 
categories of protected persons from the proportionality 
assessment. 
 The preparatory work for Article 12 is silent on the matter.38 
This is not surprising given that in 1949 the relevant rules 
regarding the conduct of hostilities had not been spelled out in 
as much detail as they are today.  However, one might have 
expected such a discussion in 1977, when simultaneously both 
the obligation to respect and protect the wounded and sick 
(Article 10 of Additional Protocol I) and specific rules 
pertaining to the conduct of hostilities (Articles 51, 57 and 58 
                                                                                                                   
 36 Id. para. 1355. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING 196 (2009).  See further 
Laurent Gisel, Can the incidental killing of military doctors never be excessive?, 95 INT’L R. 
RED CROSS 215 (2013). 
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of Additional Protocol I) were at issue.  Nevertheless, the 
preparatory work for Article 10 of the Protocol is likewise 
silent on the matter.39 
Nonetheless, contrary to the express terms of relevant treaty provisions, the 
Commentary authors suggest that the weight of IHL itself demands that these 
individuals be considered to fall within the scope of the proportionality 
obligation: 
[I]n view of the specific protections accorded to the wounded 
and sick, namely the obligation to respect (and to protect) them 
in all circumstances, a fortiori they should also benefit from the 
protection accorded to civilians.  In other words, if civilians are 
to be included in the proportionality assessment all the more so 
should the wounded and sick.40 
Thus, with regard to wounded and sick members of the armed forces, and, by 
implication, non-combatant members of the armed forces, the 2016 
Commentary answers the proportionality applicability question in the 
affirmative.  Indeed, the Commentary specifically indicates that “the 
presence of wounded and sick members of the armed forces in the vicinity of 
a military objective is to be taken into consideration when carrying out a 
proportionality assessment prior to an attack.”41  
There is no denying that the Commentary interpretation does, on the 
surface at least, seem logical from a humanitarian perspective.  After all, 
what good is a strict prohibition on the targeting of the wounded and sick 
members of the armed forces if there is no accordant obligation to include 
them within the assessment of impermissible incidental harm anticipated 
from an otherwise lawful attack?  As the Commentary notes: 
Indeed, if the wounded and sick were not to be considered for 
purposes of the proportionality principle, their presence in the 
vicinity of legitimate military objectives would be legally 
irrelevant.  However, this would contradict the explicit 
obligation to respect them in all circumstances and the basic 
rationale of according special protection to them.  It would be 
unreasonable to consider that direct or indiscriminate attacks 
against the wounded and sick would be strictly prohibited and 
                                                                                                                   
 39 2016 Commentary GWS, supra note 4, paras. 1355–1356. 
 40 Id. para. 1357. 
 41 Id. 
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would amount to a grave breach, while incidental harm and 
even excessive incidental casualties would not be prohibited.42 
But one need not drill too deeply to call this logic into question.  As noted 
above, even the Commentary recognizes that nothing in the text, or the 
preparatory work of AP I validates the extension of the proportionality 
obligation beyond civilians and civilian objects to this category of 
individuals and objects.43  In fact, the plain text of AP I contradicts this 
extension, as the proportionality rule is expressly intended to protect only the 
civilian population,44 a category that does not include members of the armed 
forces.  Because qualifying as wounded and sick pursuant to Article 12 of the 
GWS, or as a non-combatant member of the armed forces pursuant to Article 
13 of the GWS in no way transforms members of the armed forces into 
civilians, the relevant proportionality treaty rules are simply inapplicable.  
By invoking an a fortiori rationale for the asserted extension of the 
proportionality obligation, the Commentary ironically acknowledges the 
invalidity of the extension it proposes.45  The Commentary asserts that the 
“greater” obligation from which this “lesser” obligation flows—the lesser 
obligation being the proportionality obligation—is the “obligation to respect 
and protect” cited in Article 10 of AP I and Article 12 of GWS.46  However, 
this a fortiori rational is inherently self-contradictory.  The proportionality 
obligation cannot be reconciled with the obligation to respect and protect 
because “[r]espect means ‘to spare, not to attack’, while protect means ‘to 
come to someone’s defence, to lend help and support.’ ”47  In contrast, any 
extension of the proportionality rule inherently allows for the infliction of 
death or injury, provided that the extent of this anticipated incidental death 
and injury is not assessed as excessive in relation to the anticipated military 
advantage from an attack.  In other words, an extension of the proportionality 
obligation to members of the armed forces falling under the scope of Articles 
12 and 13 of the GWS for the reason proffered by the Commentary is a 
contradiction in and of itself. While the humanitarian extension may be 
reasonably appealing, the Commentary’s rational is in fact illogical, as the 
                                                                                                                   
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. para. 1356. 
 44 See AP I, supra note 2, arts. 50–51, 57. 
 45 2016 Commentary GWS, supra note 4, para. 1357 (“However, in view of the specific 
protections accorded to the wounded and sick, namely the obligation to respect (and to 
protect) them in all circumstances, a fortiori they should also benefit from the protection 
accorded to civilians.”). 
 46 Id.  
 47 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, para. 446 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987); see also AP I, supra note 2, art. 10. 
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supposed “lesser” obligation is a direct contradiction to the “greater” 
obligation suggested by the ICRC’s a fortiori rationale.  
Furthermore, the Commentary’s approach fails to address several 
additional, complex questions that arise as the result of extending 
proportionality to protect wounded and sick members of the armed forces 
and military medical objects.  For example, can or should wounded and sick 
members of the armed forces and those who care for them be ipso facto 
equated with civilians?  When assessing the consequence of anticipated 
incidental injury and collateral damage, is the weight accorded to these 
individuals and objects identical to that of civilians and civilian objects?  
Does the humanitarian underpinning of the extension justify a more 
restrictive application of proportionality, or does the inherent military nature 
of these individuals and objects justify a diminished proportionality 
protection?  In any event, what is the legal basis for even resolving these 
questions once it is conceded that the proportionality obligation never 
contemplated addressing concerns associated with protecting military 
personnel and equipment?  Finally, how is the calculation of permissible 
harm to be guided?  Does it apply in all operational and tactical situations?  
Is it limited to only post-evacuation contexts?  Does it arise the moment the 
combatant is considered wounded and sick, or is there some necessary delay 
between initial incapacitation and application of the protection? 
The Commentary fails to adequately consider these complexities.  This is 
not surprising, as an effort to address the complexities almost immediately 
exposes the inherent inconsistencies between extending the proportionality 
rule to these individuals and facilities and their association with the armed 
forces.  Most problematic, however, is the Commentary’s failure to address 
the question of timing.  Specifically, at what point does the proportionality 
obligation become applicable?  Does it arise whenever there is actual 
knowledge that wounded and sick combatants and/or non-combatant 
members of the armed forces are proximate to an anticipated target, or 
perhaps even when a reasonable attacking commander should anticipate such 
presence?  An affirmative answer to this question seems inherently 
unworkable.  For example, engaging an enemy force will often result in 
immediate actual knowledge that casualties were inflicted, or at least a high 
probability of such an outcome.  Indeed, the military decision-making 
process relies on predictions of enemy casualty rates to inform anticipated 
force ratios in the operational planning process.  Knowledge of enemy order 
of battle will frequently indicate that non-combatant members of the armed 
forces are co-mingled with combatants. 
Consider a hypothetical engagement between the armed forces of the 
United States and Iraq.  While making a southerly approach towards 
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Baghdad, the U.S. commander receives reliable intelligence that a large 
number of Iraqi Revolutionary Guard members are fortifying the east bank of 
the Euphrates River in an effort to hold the American advance before they 
can cross.  In response, the U.S. commander orders a massive combined 
arms bombardment of enemy positions along the sparsely populated east 
bank.  Now imagine that the initial post-fire assessment indicates that a 
significant number of Iraqi troops have been injured, but that intelligence 
also indicates movement by Revolutionary Guard reinforcements to the area 
to bolster the defense of the river.  If a proposed proportionality obligation 
arises as soon as an enemy combatant is rendered wounded and sick, then 
every attack decision following the “first salvo” would require a 
proportionality assessment.  This approach would require the U.S. 
commander to postpone a subsequent attack decision in order to first conduct 
a proportionality assessment to protect the wounded Iraqi soldiers and 
military medical personnel in the target area.  
While the humanitarian objective of sparing the wounded and sick 
additional suffering and protecting those exclusively engaged in their 
collection and care might render this outcome appealing, it is simply 
inconsistent with the traditional approach to conducting hostilities.  Indeed, it 
seems implausible that state practice supports such an extension of the 
proportionality obligation.  An inherent flaw in the concept is exposed by 
this hypothetical: it fails to account for the true nature of status-based 
targeting of enemy assets.  The commander in our hypothetical is not making 
attack decisions based on individualized threat assessments.  Instead, he is 
attacking the enemy in its collective capacity, seeking to render the enemy 
unit as combat ineffective.  Injecting a proportionality obligation into the 
overall process of executing the attack will undermine the commander’s 
ability to press tactical advantage and set the tempo of the engagement in 
order to maximize the collective impact on the enemy force.  Such an 
application of the proportionality obligation would therefore be entirely 
inconsistent with the nature of combat operations, and furthermore, IHL 
itself.  For, as is noted in the UK Law of War Manual, “The law of armed 
conflict is consistent with the economic and efficient use of force.  It is 
intended to minimize the suffering caused by armed conflict rather than 
impede military efficiency.”48 
It may be an unfortunate necessity of combat that wounded, sick, and 
non-combatant members of the armed forces remain exposed to the collateral 
                                                                                                                   
 48 U.K Ministry of Defence, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 
JSP 383, para. 2.1., at 21 (2004), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att 
achment_data/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.pdf. 
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consequences of attacks directed against the units they are associated with, 
but this is consistent with the traditional balance between necessity and 
humanity manifested in the GWS and AP I.49  These treaties impose 
important limitations on the conduct of hostilities to protect the wounded, 
sick, and military medical personnel and facilities.  But unlike application of 
the proportionality obligation, these obligations are consistent with the 
inherent necessities of the conduct of hostilities.  There is simply no 
legitimate necessity in directing an attack against an enemy combatant who 
is incapable of participating in hostilities as the result of wounds or sickness.  
Necessity cannot justify directing an attack at members of the armed forces 
(and their facilities) exclusively engaged in the humanitarian function of 
collecting and caring for the wounded and sick because the individuals they 
aid are no longer capable of contributing to enemy combatant activities (and 
of course, once returned to service as combatants, attack authority is 
logically resurrected).  None of these prohibitions compromise the 
effectiveness of combat operations against enemy forces.  As noted above, 
the same cannot be said for the proportionality obligation. 
While the incompatibility of extending a proportionality obligation to 
military personnel and assets during combat engagements may be obvious, 
the matter becomes more nuanced as the medical response begins to 
materialize.  This nuance may suggest that applicability of the 
proportionality obligation should depend on crossing some tactical 
demarcation.  While this might be responsive to the concerns addressed 
above, it still raises serious practical and theoretical complexities.  From a 
practical standpoint, identifying the proportionality “trigger point” would be 
both difficult and inherently arbitrary.  Would the obligation arise at the 
moment the wounded and sick are collected by military medical personnel?  
Or does it arise when they reach the field medical station, or the combat 
support hospital?  Should applicability be based on conclusive demarcation 
points or would they be merely guidelines subject to a totality of the 
circumstances assessment?  How would the tempo of combat operations 
factor into this assessment?  The Commentary completely fails to address 
this issue, and simply overlooks the complexity of this timing question.50  
                                                                                                                   
 49 AP I, supra note 3, part II.   
 50 The 2016 Commentary also suggests that “on the basis of the same rationale, an attacker 
must take precautions in accordance with Article 57 of Additional Protocol I in relation not 
only to civilians but also to wounded and sick members of the armed forces, to protect them 
from direct attack and collateral damage.”  2016 Commentary GWS, supra note 4, para. 1357.  
While also problematic, the warning component of the precautionary obligation is less 
concerning, as AP I expressly indicates that a warning is not required if circumstances do not 
permit.  AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(c).  However, there are unanswered questions specific to 
the precautionary obligation as well.  For example, in the civilian context, AP I requires that 
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The theoretical flaw in a qualified application of the obligation is also 
significant.  Limiting application of the obligation to only certain tactical and 
operational situations creates an inherent humanitarian inconsistency: the 
protection is not based on status, but instead on the situation.  When applied 
as intended to protect civilians and civilian property, the proportionality 
obligation is purely status based, it applies based on the status of the 
individuals and/or property subjected to risk, and is not qualified based on 
where or when this risk arises.  If, as the Commentary asserts, application of 
the proportionality obligation to military wounded, sick, and medical 
personnel and facilities is derived from the respect and protect obligation, 
then it, like application to civilians and civilian property, must be exclusively 
status based.  It is impossible to reconcile application of the protection in 
some tactical circumstances but not others with the premise that it is derived 
from the obligation to respect and protect.  
Ultimately, while the objective of protecting military wounded, sick, and 
medical personnel and facilities from the incidental effects of combat 
operations is a logical humanitarian goal, reliance on an extension of the 
proportionality rule to achieve this goal is illogical.  This does not, however, 
mean that consideration of risk to such individuals and facilities is irrelevant 
in the attack decision-making process.  This opposite end of the protection 
spectrum is reflected in the 2015 DoD Law of War Manual. 
B.  The 2015 DoD Law of War Manual 
The 2015 Department of Defense Law of War Manual adopted the 
opposite approach to the question of extending proportionality protection to 
wounded and sick members of the armed forces, as well as military medical 
and religious personnel (an approach that remains unchanged in the 2016 
revision to the Manual, discussed in Part V).  The 2015 Manual indicated in 
several paragraphs that these personnel51 and objects did not fall within the 
scope of the proportionality obligation.52  For example, paragraph 7.3.3.1 of 
the 2015 Manual directed that: 
                                                                                                                   
when there is a choice between two methods of attaining a similar military objective, the one 
that poses the least risk to civilians must be selected. Id. The Commentary’s suggestion of a 
precautionary obligation presumably includes such a requirement specific to those rendered 
wounded and sick, when blended with the timing concerns addressed earlier, presents a 
potential hindrance to a commander’s ability to effectively wage war. 
 51 Such personnel are often referred to as “non-combatant members of the armed forces.” 
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, Rule 3 (Feb. 24, 2017), https://ihl-da 
tabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule3. 
 52 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 7.3.3.1, 7.8.2.1, 7.10.1.1.  
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The respect and protection due to the wounded, sick, and 
shipwrecked do not cover incidental damage or casualties due 
to proximity to military objectives or to a justifiable mistake.  
Because combatants who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked on 
the battlefield are deemed to have accepted the risk of death or 
further injury due to proximity to military operations, they need 
not be considered as incidental harm in assessing 
proportionality in conducting attacks.53 
This assertion may seem inconsistent with the overarching rule enumerated 
in paragraph 7.3:  
Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned in 
Article 13 of the GWS and the GWS-Sea, who are wounded, 
sick, or shipwrecked, shall be respected and protected in all 
circumstances.  Such persons are among the categories of 
persons placed hors de combat; making them the object of 
attack is strictly prohibited.54 
However, contrasting these two paragraphs reveals the clear distinction that 
the 2015 Manual drew between protecting wounded and sick combatants 
from deliberate attack, and protecting them from the incidental 
consequences of deliberate attack directed against proximate lawful targets. 
The former is prohibited in accordance with the express terms of the GWS; 
the latter is expressly excluded from the protective regime of the Manual. 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Id. § 7.3.3.1.  This particular provision is specifically referencing the individuals who fall 
within the relevant definitions of the First and Second Geneva Conventions, and not civilian 
wounded and sick, when stating “wounded, sick, and shipwrecked.”  See id. § 7.3. 
  To contrast, the 2016 DoD Manual includes the following language, with the italicized 
portion identifying that language remaining unchanged:  
The respect and protection due to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked do not 
prohibit incidental damage or casualties due to their proximity to military 
objectives or to a justifiable mistake. Combatants who are wounded, sick, or 
shipwrecked on the battlefield are deemed to have accepted the risk of death 
or further injury due to their proximity to military operations.  Although the 
presence of the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked on the battlefield does not 
serve to exempt military objectives from attack due to the risk that such 
personnel would be incidentally harmed, feasible precautions must be taken 
to reduce the risk of harm to the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 7.3.3.1 (June 2015, updated Dec. 2016) 
[hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, Dec. 2016 ed.] (emphasis added).   See also Part V 
for a more detailed discussion of the 2016 Manual’s changes. 
 54 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, Dec. 2016 ed., supra note 53 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Accordingly, there was no inconsistency between the “strictly prohibited” 
language of paragraph 7.3 and the subsequent indication that wounded and 
sick combatants are in no way relevant to proportionality considerations.  
Similarly, paragraph 7.10.1 indicated that military medical units and 
facilities, “must not knowingly be attacked, fired upon, or unnecessarily 
prevented form discharging their proper function,” the key term being 
knowingly.  This paragraph aligned with the overall scheme of the Manual’s 
treatment of military wounded and sick, medical personnel, and facilities, as 
it prohibited making such units or facilities the object of attack.  However, as 
with wounded and sick combatants, paragraph 7.10.1.1 indicated that, “[t]he 
incidental harm to medical units or facilities, due to their presence among or 
proximity to combatant elements actually engaged by fire directed at the 
latter, gives no just cause for complaint.”55  And as was the case with the 
military wounded and sick, the rational provided was that “medical units and 
facilities that are positioned near military objectives are deemed to have 
accepted the risk of death or further injury due to proximity to military 
operations” and therefore, “they need not be considered as incidental harm in 
assessing proportionality in conducting attacks”56  
Finally, the 2015 DoD Manual approach offered yet again the same rule 
and rational when addressing risk to non-combatant members of the armed 
forces.  Like military wounded and sick, paragraph 7.8 indicated that such 
personnel are to be respected and protected.57 However, paragraph 7.8.2.1 
emphasized that this obligation did not include a proportionality constraint:  
                                                                                                                   
 55 Id. § 7.10.1.1.  In the 2016 DoD Manual, the quoted language remained unchanged. See 
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, Dec. 2016 ed., supra note 53, § 7.10.1.1. 
 56 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 7.10.1.1.  In the 2016 DoD Manual, the 
quoted language remains unchanged. However, as with 7.3.3.1, the language directly 
subsequent the above quote from 7.10.1.1 has been altered.  The unaltered portion is italicized 
for convenience: 
The incidental harm to military medical units or facilities, due to their 
presence among or in proximity to combatant elements actually engaged, by 
fire directed at the latter, gives no just cause for complaint. Commanders are 
obligated to situate military medical units and facilities such that they are not 
in danger from attack against military objectives.  Military medical units and 
facilities that are positioned near military objectives are deemed to have 
accepted the risk of harm due to their proximity to military operations. 
Although the presence of military medical units and facilities does not serve 
to exempt nearby military objectives from attack due to the risk that military 
medical units and facilities would be incidentally harmed, feasible 
precautions must be taken to reduce the risk of harm to military medical units 
and facilities. 
See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, Dec. 2016 ed., supra note 53, § 7.10.1.1. 
 57 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 7.8. 
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The incidental killing or wounding of such personnel, due to 
their presence among or in proximity to combatant elements 
actually engaged by fire directed at the latter, gives no just 
cause for complaint.  Because medical and religious personnel 
are deemed to have accepted the risk of death or further injury 
due to proximity to military operations, they need not be 
considered as incidental harm in assessing proportionality in 
conducting attacks.58 
Now, because paragraphs 7.3.3, 7.8.2, and 7.10.1 indicated that “respect 
and protection” means “that they [protected military personnel like the 
wounded and sick, and non-combatant members of the armed forces] should 
not be knowingly attacked, fired upon, or unnecessarily interfered with,”59 it 
may be possible to imply a proportionality consideration. This is because 
proportionality assessments by their very nature involve attack judgments 
informed by the knowledge of incidental injury or collateral damage.60 
However, in the case of the 2015 DoD Manual, it is implausible to read the 
prohibition against “knowingly” attacked or “unnecessarily interfered with” 
as a subtle opening to extend a Commentary-like proportionality rule to these 
personnel.  Paragraphs 7.3.3, 7.8.2, and 7.10.1 cannot be read in isolation, 
but instead alongside the paragraphs directly following them, 7.3.3.1, 7.8.2.1, 
and 7.10.1.1, which expressly rejected the application of the proportionality 
obligation with regard to these personnel.  Consistent with the discussion 
above, this seems to confirm that the DoD Manual used the term 
“knowingly” as a synonym for deliberately.  
Taken together, these provisions of the 2015 DoD Manual indicated that 
the emphasis on knowledge in relation to the respect and protect obligation 
was not intended to suggest a prohibition on the knowing infliction of 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Id. § 7.8.2.1.  Again to contrast, the 2016 DoD Manual includes the following language, 
with the italicized portion identifying that language remaining unchanged: 
The incidental killing or wounding of such personnel, due to their presence 
among or in proximity to combatant elements actually engaged by fire 
directed at the latter, gives no just cause for complaint. Medical and 
religious personnel are deemed to have accepted the risk of death or injury 
due to their proximity to military operations.  Although the presence of 
medical and religious personnel does not serve to exempt nearby military 
objectives from attack due to the risk that military medical and religious 
personnel would be incidentally harmed, feasible precautions must be taken 
to reduce the risk of harm to military medical and religious personnel. 
See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, Dec. 2016 ed., supra note 53, § 7.8.2.1. 
 59 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 7.3.3, 7.8.2, 7.10.1 (emphasis added). 
 60 Valerie Epps, Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare: The Death of the Collateral 
Damage Rule, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 307, 330 (2013). 
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incidental injury and/or collateral damage—the type of harm implicated by 
the proportionality obligation.  Instead, they indicated a prohibition on 
launching an attack knowing that it is directed against protected personnel or 
objects.  The DoD Manual clearly acknowledged that commanders will often 
have knowledge that military wounded and sick and medical personnel and 
facilities will be subjected to incidental harm as the result of an attack on a 
proximate military objective.  However, so long as the anticipated harm is 
incidental, and not knowingly directed against such personnel and facilities, 
it is permissible, and does not implicate the proportionality assessment.  
Therefore, according the 2015 DoD Manual approach, a commander was 
forced to make a determination of whether that “reasonable idea” constitutes 
“knowing” an attack is directed against a protected target, and if it did, the 
attack was (and currently still is under the 2016 DoD Manual) legally 
impermissible.  But if that reasonable idea did not result in a knowing the 
attack was directed against a protected target, the commander then had no 
obligation to apply a secondary restrictive proportionality assessment.  
The DoD Manual’s position on the inapplicability of the proportionality 
obligation to military wounded and sick, medical personnel, and medical 
facilities was, as noted above, justifiable based on the status of these 
individuals and objects.  However, just as the ICRC Commentary approach 
suffers from overbreadth, the 2015 DoD Manual approach suffered from 
arguable under-inclusiveness.  While the proportionality obligation may not 
technical be applicable to this context, the indication that risk to these 
individuals and objects is never a relevant consideration when making an 
attack decision seems problematic in situations where such consideration will 
not compromise tactical or operational effectiveness.  At some point, the 
approach incorporated into the 2015 Manual seems too dismissive of the 
humanitarian rational of IHL.  Should an attacking commander ever be 
required to factor such risk into attack decisions?  Is the Manual correct in 
suggesting that a commander is never required to consider implementing 
measures to mitigate such risk?  Perhaps a middle ground between the 
Commentary and Manual approach should be explored. 
Fortunately, as will be explained in Part V, the 2016 revision of the 
Manual, while reiterating the inapplicability of a proportionality obligation 
vis-à-vis these personnel and objects, ameliorated the impact of this under-
inclusiveness by reconsidering the extension of precautionary measures. 
However, before addressing this approach to mitigating the troubling 
humanitarian over-breadth of complete indifference to the collateral 
consequences on these personnel and objects resulting from otherwise lawful 
attacks, it is worth considering whether basic dictates of humanity compel a 
middle-ground approach to this problem. 
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IV.  THE HUMANITARIAN BASIS FOR A MIDDLE-GROUND APPROACH 
The dichotomy between the ICRC’s 2016 Commentary and the DoD 
Manual interpretations of the applicability of the proportionality rule to 
military medical personnel, wounded and sick, and units and facilities is 
undeniable.  As indicated above, both are arguably flawed.  But the 
Commentary’s basic premise—that at some point in the complex continuum 
of tactical execution, efforts to mitigate this specific risk should influence a 
commander’s attack decisions—is ultimately aligned with the humanitarian 
objectives of the law.  The truly difficult question that either approach fails 
to address is the ‘when’ and ‘why’?  
Starting with the ‘why,’ neither the extension of the proportionality 
obligation, nor the respect and protect obligation, provide the most 
compelling answer.  Perhaps there is a more credible, albeit general 
foundation for extending some protection against collateral consequences to 
these personnel and objects—basic considerations of humanity. Is this 
particular situation one of those rare dilemmas that the Martens Clause can 
help to resolve? Perhaps. 
F.F. de Martens, Russian delegate to the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, 
is responsible for the drafting and implementation of an iconic clause present 
first in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague II Convention.61  The Martens Clause 
states: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the 
High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases 
not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations 
and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the 
principles of international law, as they result from the usages 
established between civilized nations, from the laws of 
humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.62 
Versions of what is today known as the Martens Clause were subsequently 
incorporated into the most important IHL treaties, including the 1899 and 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public 
Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 79 (2000). 
 62 Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 1899, Preamble, 32 
Stat. 1779, T.S. 423. 
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1907 Hague Conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 
Additional Protocols, and the CCW.63 
The Martens Clause was initially a compromise among the parties to the 
1899 Hague Peace Conference regarding the controversial debate as to 
whether the inhabitants of an occupied territory had a right to resist the 
occupying forces.64  However, the significance of this provision has evolved 
substantially since its original adoption.  Today, the Clause is recognized as 
an important “gap filler” to address areas of humanitarian uncertainty.65  As a 
matter of customary international law, the Martens Clause embodies the 
notion that, where no specific rule applies, the core principles of IHL arise to 
dictate the conduct of hostilities.66  Accordingly, perhaps a limited 
application of the proportionality obligation should function to protect 
military casualties and the personnel and equipment devoted to their care, an 
obligation derived from the Martens Clause. 
The Martens Clause approach also helps clarify the question of ‘when’ a 
proportionality obligation arises.  Specifically, only when elemental 
considerations of humanity justify application—considerations that account for 
legitimate interests of military necessity—does the obligation come into force.  
This interpretation allows for consideration of each tactical situation on an 
individual and practical basis by accounting for imposition of protection at 
mature medical treatment locations, but not in the midst of combat 
engagements.  This reading balances the logic of the DoD Manual (that the 
                                                                                                                   
 63 See Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
Preface, 36 Stat. 2277 , T.S. 539; GWS, supra note 4, art. 63; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 62, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 971; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 142 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 
972; GC, supra note 34 (collectively, the Geneva Conventions); Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, Preamble, 1342 UNTS 
137.  For an excellent insight into the historical origins of the Clause and the background of 
the Clause’s author, see Jeffrey Kahn, “Protection and Empire”: The Martens Clause, State 
Sovereignty, and Individual Rights, 56 VA. J. INT’L L.1 (2016). 
 64 ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 9 (3d ed. 2000) 
(“The wording of the Martens Clause was agreed at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference for a 
specific reason: it was a compromise following difficult and unresolved debates about whether 
the inhabitants of occupied territory had a right of resistance.”). 
 65 Kahn, supra note 63, at 18. 
 66 Cf. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, 260 (July 8).  The court specifically states, “the Martens Clause, whose continuing 
existence and applicability is not to be doubted, as an affirmation that the principles and rules 
of humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons.”  Id.  While the context of the advisory 
opinion regards the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the court’s acknowledgment that the 
Martens Clause ensures that the principles of IHL apply to such weapons is foretelling of its 
vast extent. 
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nature of hostilities renders it illogical to require a proportionality assessment 
whenever risk to these individuals and facilities is created by an attack) with 
humanitarian considerations (by requiring risk mitigation efforts to protect 
such personnel and facilities when doing so is not tactically illogical).  It is 
noteworthy that the DoD recently published a policy letter that appears to 
endorse this type of Marten’s Clause approach to this issue.  Specifically, the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs 
issued a policy titled, “Principles Related to the Protection of Medical Care 
Provided by Impartial Humanitarian Orgs. During Armed Conflicts.”67  
According to this policy letter, “[C]onsiderations of humanity, proportionality, 
and honor should guide combatants in all their interactions with the wounded 
and sick.”68 
The Martens Clause is concededly general in its terms and vague in its 
relevance.  However, it does seem to suggest that parties to armed conflict 
should be constantly guided by humanitarian considerations, and therefore 
seek to mitigate the suffering of war to only that which is justified by the 
dictates of military necessity. Where the ICRC seems on track is in the 
recognition that such a lacuna exists due to the absence of any positive 
proportionality protection for military wounded and sick, and the personnel, 
equipment, and facilities exclusively engaged in their collection and care. 
The Martens Clause therefore provides a logical basis for parties to a conflict 
to seek some operationally rational method to avoid, where feasible, 
unnecessary infliction of suffering on these personnel and objects.  In 
practice, precautionary risk mitigation measures offer a more operationally 
logical solution to this dilemma than does extending the proportionality rule. 
This is because such measures would be required only when tactically and 
operationally feasible.  Such an approach would produce a wide margin of 
appreciation for assessing when precautions must be employed, but would 
also emphasize that there is, at some point of tactical and operational logic, 
an obligation to seek to mitigate risk to military medical personnel and 
facilities.  As explained below, this is precisely the approach incorporated 
into the 2016 revision to the DoD Law of War Manual.  
                                                                                                                   
 67 Policy Letter, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def. (DASD) for Stability and Humanitarian 
Affairs, DEP’T OF DEF., subject: Principles Related to the Protection of Medical Care Provided 
by Impartial Humanitarian Orgs. During Armed Conflicts (Oct. 6, 2016). 
 68  Id. at II.C. 
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V.  THE 2016 LAW OF WAR MANUAL REVISION: EMBRACING THE 
PRECAUTIONS APPROACH 
After the date of the symposium for which we first addressed this issue, 
the Department of Defense issued an updated version of the original June 
2015 Law of War Manual. This December 2016 Manual incorporates a host 
of revisions on punctuation and spacing, style, correction of typographical 
and administrative errors, as well as minor and significant substantive 
changes and clarifications.  This update, issued just a year-and-a-half after 
initial publication, should be acknowledged as a positive development.  The 
Department of Defense has demonstrated a continuing commitment to 
identifying areas of beneficial improvement to the Manual.  This is 
evidenced by the Office of General Counsel’s request for comment and 
criticism of the Manual, a request made on the same day of the Manual’s 
initial publication.69 
Since articulating the initial Martens Clause proposal, the views of the 
authors of this Article have also evolved.70  As a result, we now suggest 
protection from collateral risk to military protected persons and equipment 
may also be logically extrapolated from the existing treaty and customary 
international law rule related to precautions in the attack.  Indeed, it is arguable 
that several of these precautions, when feasibly implemented, provide a more 
compelling basis to support extending this protection than the proportionality 
approach advanced by the ICRC Commentary.  Specifically, this protection 
should focus on extending AP I’s Article 57 feasible precautions, to include 
the obligation to do all that is feasible to verify the nature of intended targets in 
order to implement the distinction obligation (which prohibits directing an 
attack against wounded and sick members of the armed forces and military 
protected persons and equipment).  Furthermore, where feasible, this 
obligation also requires commanders to issue warnings to enable the enemy to 
                                                                                                                   
 69 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 1.1.1 (“This manual does not, however, 
preclude the Department from subsequently changing its interpretation of the law.”); U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEFENSE, DIR. 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR, PROGRAM (9 May 2006, current 22 Feb. 2011). 
 70 This Article was originally written in October 2016, several months before the release of 
the updated December 2016 DoD Law of War Manual.  At that time, the authors thought the 
Martens Clause to be one credible approach by which to alleviate the disparity between the 
ICRC and DoD approaches.  However, the extremes of this disparity were substantially 
alleviated when the Department of Defense subsequently published a significant change in the 
revised Law of War Manual that addressed this specific issue.  
  Released in December 2016, precautionary measures emerged as the DoD solution to the 
challenge of protecting military wounded and sick, medical personnel, and equipment and 
facilities from the collateral effects of otherwise lawful attacks. 
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mitigate collateral risk; and again, where feasible, employ methods or means 
of attack that also mitigate that risk. 
Interestingly, this is the new approach adopted by the U.S. Department of 
Defense for balancing the competing interests associated with this collateral 
risk problem. This is reflected in the updated 2016 DoD Manual, which, 
when addressing the protection of military protected persons and assets, no 
longer contains the line “they need not be considered as incidental harm in 
assessing proportionality in conducting attacks,”71 and instead clarifies in 
7.3.3.1, and similarly in 7.8.2.172 and 7.10.1.1,73 that:  
The respect and protection due to the wounded, sick, and 
shipwrecked do not prohibit incidental damage or casualties 
due to their proximity to military objectives or to a justifiable 
mistake.  Combatants who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked 
on the battlefield are deemed to have accepted the risk of death 
or further injury due to their proximity to military operations. 
Although the presence of the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked on 
the battlefield does not serve to exempt military objectives from 
attack due to the risk that such personnel would be incidentally 
harmed, feasible precautions must be taken to Although the 
presence of the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked on the 
battlefield does not serve to exempt military objectives from 
attack due to the risk that such personnel would be incidentally 
harmed, feasible precautions must be taken to reduce the risk 
of harm to the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked.74 
In support of this asserted precautions obligation, the 2016 DoD Manual 
cites back to the section addressing the obligation to take feasible precautions 
to mitigate risk to civilians and civilian property, which in turn relies on 
Article 57 of AP I.75  In one respect, using Article 57 as the foundation for 
extending precautionary measures to such individuals and assets may seem 
somewhat inconsistent with the rejection of extending the proportionality 
rule of AP I to the same people and objects, as a proportionality assessment 
                                                                                                                   
 71 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 7.3.3.1.  See also id. § 7.8.2.1, 7.10.1.1. 
 72 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (for a comparison between the language of the 
2015 and 2016 Manuals). 
 73 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (for a comparison between the language of the 
2015 and 2016 Manuals). 
 74 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, Dec. 2016 ed., supra note 2, § 7.3.3.1; see also supra note 
53 and accompanying text (for a comparison between the language of the 2015 and 2016 
Manuals). 
 75 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, Dec. 2016 ed., supra note 2, § 5.10.1.2. 
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is one of the precautions enumerated in Article 57.  The Manual does not 
explicitly explain why it rejects the extension of one rule applicable by its 
terms only to civilians (i.e., proportionality), but then indicates that during 
attacks, feasible precautionary measures must be implemented to mitigate 
risk to military protected persons and equipment.  
There is, however, a plausible textual basis for this partial application of 
Article 57’s precautions—the target verification precaution in Article 57(2).  
Article 57(2)(a) states: 
With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be 
taken: 
a) those who plan or decide upon an attack shall: 
i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be 
attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects and are 
not subject to special protection but are military 
objectives within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 
52 and that it is not prohibited by the provisions of this 
Protocol to attack them; 
ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and 
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any 
event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians and damage to civilian objects; 
iii) refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated;76 
Article 57(2)(a) includes within its terms protection not only of civilians and 
civilian objects, but also people and places subject to “special protection.”  
This “special protection” basis for requiring the target verification 
precaution, but not a proportionality precaution, is bolstered by the text of 
Article 57(2)(b), which requires that an attack be cancelled or suspended 
when it becomes apparent that an intended target is subject to “special 
protection.”  
(b) an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes 
apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to 
special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause 
                                                                                                                   
 76 AP I, supra note 2, art. 57(2)(b) (emphasis added). 
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incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated;77 
The key to the application of the feasibility precaution, but not the 
proportionality precaution, lies within the text of the “civilian” component to 
Article 57(2)(b).  Note that an attack must to be cancelled or suspended 
based on a proportionality violation—“that the attack may be expected to 
cause incidental loss . . . excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated”—only when the attack will endanger 
civilians, civilian property, or a combination of the two.  This qualifier is not 
present and applicable to those persons and objects enjoying “special 
protection,” which is only led by a qualifier indicative of keeping them from 
being the deliberate intended target of attack.  
Going back to the earlier portrayed hypothetical engagement between the 
United States and Iraq,78 the feasibility element to the precautionary 
measures approach provides a more rational answer than the extension of the 
proportionality rule.  After the American’s first salvo, halting or even 
pausing a subsequent attack on the Iraqi position in order to mitigate risks to 
enemy wounded personnel and those tending to them would hardly be 
considered feasible.  Therefore, unlike under the proportionality approach 
proffered by the ICRC Commentary, a feasibility approach would not inhibit 
the U.S. commander’s ability to press tactical advantage and set the tempo of 
the engagement in order to maximize the collective impact on the Iraqi force.  
Furthermore, the feasible precautions approach does not ignore other 
tactical situations where protection may be feasibly extended to wounded 
and sick members of the armed forces and military protected persons and 
equipment.  For example, it is quite common for military units to co-locate 
medical aid stations and other forward collection and treatment facilities in 
military logistics clusters.  This cluster method better facilitates the rapid 
reconstitution of resources with the backhaul of casualties.  However, this 
also means that an attack on the logistics cluster itself jeopardizes inflicting 
collateral damage to the medical aid station and collection and treatment 
facilities, as well as their occupants.  In this context, precautions related to 
the means and methods of attack could not only be feasibly implemented, but 
could mitigate risks to the aid station and its occupants.  The feasible 
precautionary measures approach, therefore, strikes an appropriate balance, 
                                                                                                                   
 77 See supra pp. 456–67 and accompanying text. 
 78 ICR to that engagement on pp. 12–13. 
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and as referenced earlier from the clear articulation of the UK Law of War 
Manual, aligns with the spirit of IHL: “The law of armed conflict is 
consistent with the economic and efficient use of force.  It is intended to 
minimize the suffering caused by armed conflict rather than impede military 
efficiency.”79 
There is another reason why the feasible precautions approach adopted by 
the 2016 DoD Manual is more credible than the proportionality approach 
from the ICRC Commentary—the inclusion of the GWS’s Article 21 
precautions-type rule for the protection of military medical facilities.  Article 
21 of the GWS provides: 
The protection to which fixed establishments and mobile 
medical units of the Medical Service are entitled shall not cease 
unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian 
duties, acts harmful to the enemy.  Protection may, however, 
cease only after a due warning has been given, naming, in all 
appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit and after such 
warning has remained unheeded.80 
While not expressly phrased as a precautionary measure, this warning 
obligation applicable to military medical facilities indicates that the drafters 
of the GWS contemplated situations where subjecting the occupants of such 
facilities to the risks of attack may be unavoidable.  However, because it will 
almost always be the case that an attack in response to misuse of such a 
facility will subject the other still protected persons in the facility to 
incidental death and injury, the GWS imposed a precautionary warning 
obligation.  This is notable for two reasons: first, it is a clear indication that 
the logical method to mitigate this risk was through the issuance of an 
appropriate warning; second, there is no indication that an attacking force 
must apply a proportionality assessment once it determines that attack is 
necessary because the enemy fails to cease the misuse after the warning. 
Ultimately, the “precautions” approach is based on a more logical treaty 
foundation than the ICRC Commentary “proportionality” approach.  And 
this is an especially important and positive development for the U.S. military 
that will hopefully be more commonly embraced, as it strikes a logical 
balance between the risks that wounded and sick members of the armed 
forces and military protected persons and equipment must accept as the result 
                                                                                                                   
 79 U.K. Ministry of Defence, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT, JSP 383, para. 2.1, at 21 (2004), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP382004Edition.pdf. 
 80 GWS, supra note 16, art. 21. 
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of their association with an armed force, and the interests of humanity that 
make complete indifference to this risk unacceptable.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Seeking to extend the protection derived from the proportionality rule to 
military wounded and sick and non-combatant members of the armed forces 
(and their facilities) is in no way illogical.  Indeed, most observers would 
likely consider completely indifference the collateral consequences of attacks 
that jeopardize these individuals and objects as inconsistent with basic 
dictates of humanity.  However, what appears appealing on the surface 
becomes increasingly inconsistent with the equally important considerations 
of military necessity as the drill penetrates the depths of application analysis. 
Basing an extension of the proportionality obligation on the respect and 
protect obligation cannot withstand scrutiny.  More importantly, it is not an 
ideal answer to the question of how to mitigate incidental and collateral risks 
to wounded and sick members of the armed forces, as well as the military 
personnel, facilities, and transportation exclusively engaged in their 
collection and care.  However, rejecting any consideration of the risks to 
these individuals, objects, and facilities based on the textual contexts of the 
proportionality rule produces an overly-broad dismissal of this humanitarian 
concern. Ultimately, it is probably true that there may not be an ideal 
solution to resolving the dilemma created the failure of positive treaty law to 
expressly address why such risk should be mitigated; it may simply be 
impossible to reconcile the logical humanitarian goal of mitigating risk to 
such personnel and facilities with existing positive legal obligations.  
Addressing this issue need not, however, be dictated by the binary 
interpretations of the scope of the proportionality obligation reflected in 
these two extremes.  Instead, a rational balance between military necessity 
and the dictates of humanity may be achieved by extending the feasible 
precautions methodology enumerated in Article 57 of AP I as adopted by the 
updated 2016 DoD Law of War Manual.  Requiring risk mitigation measures 
when operationally and tactically feasible—meaning such measures will not 
meaningfully compromise the interests of military necessity—seems to be a 
logical approach to achieving an acceptable balance to protect such 
individuals and objects from unnecessary collateral risks.  Furthermore, in 
comparison to the ICRC Commentary proportionality extension, this 
approach is better aligned with the GWS Article 21 rule related to the misuse 
of military medical facilities.  It is also better aligned with the instincts of 
military commanders.  After all, why would any commander forego the 
opportunity to reduce risk to wounded and sick combatants and non-
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combatant members of the armed forces when doing so in no way 
compromises or degrades his or her efforts to achieve military objectives and 
defeat enemy forces? 
Such a resolution is bolstered by its consistency with the interests 
reflected in the Martens Clause.  This approach is certainly no talisman, and 
cannot eliminate all uncertainty related to when the protection applies and 
how it is best implemented.  However, it will at least eliminate the risk that 
combatants completely ignore risk to the wounded, sick, military medical 
personnel, and facilities when planning and executing combat operations.  
Ultimately, indifference towards these personnel and facilities is almost 
impossible to reconcile with the dictates of “public conscience.”  As such, 
the shadow of Feodor Martens may be broad enough to cover this space. 
